How keeping a promise led me to Locally Led.

How boiling anger over broken systems and empty promises—affecting those I love most—led me, and a group of like minds, to make a promise of our own.

Just over a year ago, I made a promise.  A promise I made to myself shortly after stepping down from the non-profit (Sawiyan) my co-founder and I had built alongside members of the Sudanese and Somali refugee community in Amman, Jordan. A promise rooted in deep love for my adopted Sawiyan family and everything we experienced and faced together.  But, before I tell you what that promise was, I need to tell you why I made it…

A recent report co-led by Devex and DI found that since the Grand Bargain in 2016-- in which leading development, humanitarian agencies, and donors pledged to increase the funding of local and national organizations, on a global scale, by 25% by 2020— only 3% of all aid funding had been given to locally-led organizations, a figure almost identical to what it was in 2016.[1] It’s a resounding piece of data. One that shows that when it comes to empowering and bringing about real localization globally, there’s been lots of talk/promises by leading agencies and donors, with limited to no understanding of how to actually accomplish it.

Leaders of locally-led and refugee-led organizations working with some of the most marginalized communities in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Latin America face significant barriers to accomplishing the change they want to make. This is not only due to the deeply complex political/regulatory environment in some of their home countries. Nor due to the fact that there seems to be an alarming decrease in respect for the humanitarian space, its principles, and human rights on a global level (ALNAP, 2022). Most importantly, one of the most significant barriers these organizations face is that of humanitarian and development sector that claims publically to be committed to the cause of localization but, on the ground, practices a top-down financing and support model that:

I.               Often dictates to local organizations the issues they should prioritize.

II.              Consistently fails to include their voices/contextual experience/leadership when designing the humanitarian response plans/development strategy process that determines their country’s futures.

III.            Dictates how these local actors should define ‘success’. 

IV.            That places exhaustive monitoring and reporting requirements, far outside of the capacity of the local actors they claim to support, leading leaders of these organizations to make the choice between compromising principles and the trust they’ve built with the communities they work with…or receiving financing.

How my experience with Sawiyan revealed broken systems.

In 2015, I co-founded a Jordanian-registered, community-led NGO alongside a team of Jordanians and members of the Sudanese refugee community living in Amman called Sawiyan. Throughout the past seven years of leading the development of the organization with my co-founder Dina Baslan (a Jordanian national), I quickly learned that regardless of how much international humanitarian donors and development actors claimed to promote the concept of localization[2], they did very little to actually ensure that it actually take place. Year after year, in our context working in MENA (Middle East and North Africa), it seemed the organizations who were least supported, least consulted in refugee response planning or setting development goals in their respective countries, were still those of the local civil society. Even worse, we watched, heartbroken, time and time again seeing fellow activists/social entrepreneurs in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and beyond make the excruciatingly difficult choice to shut down their organizations, initiatives, and projects due to lack of consistent financial support and solidarity from many of those who claim to champion the cause of ‘localization’.

Members of the Sawiyan team at a retreat for our community-led research team

To this end, over the past five years, we at Sawiyan spent significant time advocating for meaningful change in the aid/development sector’s level of commitment to localized aid and refugee-led initiatives/organizations. We implemented and collaborated on research exposing the gaps in the present system and showing how powerful real, serious commitment to locally-led organizations can look like in the sector.[3] We met organizations, influential donors, and think tanks and spoke openly about how critical change was needed in order for organizations and community movements like Sawiyan to truly flourish in the region. Much of this advocacy and research was received warmly and complimented, but we saw limited change in approach by many of the key stakeholders we advocated to, consulted, or advised.

During this period, I also had the unique experience of being a founding member and chair of the One Refuge Approach Working Group in Jordan—an experience that allowed me to develop a number of strong relationships with some of the sector’s ‘key’ humanitarian donor stakeholders in Jordan. Or, I should say, in the eyes of the traditionalist humanitarian they were the ‘key’ stakeholders. It was through this experience of leading the coalition of 20+ organizations pushing for a more inclusive Jordan Response Plan, that I saw some of the most significant failures within the present system. Locally-led organizations and refugees had limited to no voice in influential inter-agency coordination or refugee response planning. The formulation of a refugee response framework was usually left up to the Government of Jordan, large international aid agencies, and the major aid donors.[4]

The consequences of not having all the necessary voices at the table in a variety of different contexts deeply impacted the communities Sawiyan served. A prime example of this is the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), which is the framework that governs and dictates humanitarian response in Jordan. Since its creation in 2016, the JRP has entirely excluded refugees of Sudanese, Somali, Yemeni, and Iraqi origin leaving these refugees extremely vulnerable.[5] The reasoning for such inexcusable exclusion is multi-faceted but, as one individual involved in putting together the initial JRP explained to me, this failure of inclusion was greatly due to the fact that those charged with planning the JRP refused to do a usual contextual, situational analysis (which would normally involve consulting and surveying stakeholders from all sectors, demographics that could be affected in a refugee response) but rather relied on senior expertise of name-brand aid agencies and Government of Jordan.[6] Similar failures were seen in the initially celebrated Jordan Compact, which aimed to deliver legal work permits and economic empowerment to refugees. With the Compact, again, only one refugee population (Syrian) was allowed to benefit, and, even those Syrians who were selected to participate in the program found themselves placed in a compromising environment with little to no improvement to their financial situation.[7] Researchers critiquing the Compact once again pointed to a project that was put together without a comprehensive analysis of ‘all’ important stakeholders ahead of time.[8]

Members of Sawiyan planning a project

My team and I also intimately experienced, firsthand, the consequences of donors who neglect to empower real, genuine localization efforts. Through different donors Sawiyan acquired over the years, the Sawiyan team saw the way many international donors tried to dictate which issues would be prioritized in a particular region or country to which they provided funding. Different donors would also put pressure on local organizations like ours in regards to what kinds of solutions they were keen to see implemented. Prioritized issues to be addressed by donors were often dictated and decided upon far from the region, city or country local civil society organizations and those they worked to help were based in. Again, instead of consulting with members of the local civil society--or members of actual marginalized individuals their programming would be targeting in the region or country of interest—these donors were rather entrusting decisions to European or North American specialists. Donors seemed more interested in latching on to whatever the ‘hot button issue’ topic was within international foreign policy, security, and philanthropy circles, ignoring the very stakeholders positioned closest to, and within, marginalized communities. At the end of the day, it seemed they valued seeking to appeal to the interests of their peers, rather than seeking to learn from insight, experience, and understanding of local organizations and refugee communities.

Our team also saw how many donors pressure locally-founded organizations like Sawiyan to monitor and evaluate success in the way they see and define ‘success’.  This was something that our team found extremely problematic. The Monitoring and Evaluation process is always important, but having donors dictating to on-the-ground organizations, or to those who are locally/refugee-led, on how success should be determined, not taking into consideration the context the organization operates in, its foundational principles, and approach to its work, often has caused Sawiyan and its local partners to be placed in seriously compromising situations. Donors would attempt to push M&E requirements forcing us to become something we were not, or compromise relationships and trust we had built with the people we have worked so hard to serve. This became increasingly problematic, especially since the communities (African-origin refugees) and the issues (refugee rights, race, gender equality, comprehensive social inclusion) we dealt with were already sensitive issues to the governing bodies in the country we were registered in.

Frustration with a broken system is reflected in recent analysis of traditional actors’ ability to effectively empower local organizations.

It also seemed that our frustration with a broken system was reflected in recent analysis of the state of global localization financing. USAID, for example, touts that they are allotting over 300 million dollars to the cause of localization around the world[9], and that they will partner with local communities to co-design/set priorities for their agency’s country/regional strategy in each particular place in the world they invest in, but, a recent piece of research by Brookings shows that words are one thing, action is different. The think tank explains that since USAID has made the shift towards prioritizing localization, the agency’s efforts have been heavily focused on building local organizations’ capacity to win and manage USAID projects—essentially coaching them on how to develop and manage USAID-standard financial and project monitoring/evaluation framework…instead of deeply looking into how they could help local organizations achieve the goals, priorities, and success that they aim to achieve. They look to impose their framework and systems instead of looking into the unique systems, approach to work, and framework these local organizations have organically developed that have provided results, and at times, significant social impact over the years. [10] Though the report explains USAID is trying to shift toward pushing their financing model towards better prioritizing the actual priorities of locally-led organizations, it depicts much of the reality our team and many organizations like Sawiyan around the world face—if you give us financial support in the name of ‘localization’, will we truly be in the driver’s seat of how that money is used and how success is defined?

Additionally, multiple reports have explained that in order for large donors (such as USAID, UN, and large philanthropic entities) to finance locally-led organizations or community movements that are not already equipped with comprehensive, top-of-the-line systems, and specialized management/technical expertise, these donors would have to retool their entire grant or aid financing system.[11] In short, the most influential donors are handicapped to only finance locally-led organizations with pre-existing, expansive internal infrastructure--often the kinds of entities run by folks who already have significant political and social capital--and, in turn, sideline some of the most potentially impactful, crucially important initiatives, as well as those initiatives led by refugee or marginalized populations. In addition to this, community-based organizations or movements at a tipping point, in the early-growth stage, routinely get frozen out and die off due to the lack of pre-existing industry-standard infrastructure. The latter was something both my co-founder and I bore witness to a variety of times over the years. Believe me, some donors have no idea of the impact they’ve killed off, or frozen out, due to an unwillingness to accept that local organizations/movements might just have a reason and logic behind the systems and approaches they organically create.

Recent research taken on by local researchers in Somalia recently spoke to the lack of say or influence local and national organizations have in decision-making and agenda-setting in their country’s humanitarian and development response and strategy. Similar to our experience in Jordan, local organizations in Somalia stated that, while they do participate in meetings, their contribution is ‘minimal due to power imbalances and limited resources to engage extensively.’[12] The report cites a leader of a local Somali NGO who expanded: ‘meetings address limited local issues. Real decisions are made at the capital level and local and national NGOs don’t have much say.’[13]

Further calling into question leading agencies’ genuine belief in the cause of localization was the evidence presented in a recent report co-led by Devex and DI that I highlighted at the opening of this paper. With the significant amount of content, statements, and humanitarian reports touting the significant commitment being made to a localized new era of humanitarianism, it should be shocking to humanitarians that since the Grand Bargain there has been almost no change in the amount of finances allocated to local organizations. It should be damning. In short, no matter what they say or promise, the aid and development sector is failing to cede power and ownership to locally and refugee-led organizations. The data shows it, I witnessed it, and the consequences are critical. 

The consequences of standing for principle and growth on ‘our own terms’

In the summer of 2022, in order to ensure Sawiyan’s principles would stay intact going forward, and to ensure the protection of all Sawiyan team members and volunteers, our team made the tough decision to de-register. This was the culmination of a number of conclusions and in-depth discussions Sawiyan leadership (community leads and its co-founders) had regarding the founding principles of the organization and what it meant to be a part of the Sawiyan movement. We were faced with two realities:

(a) Make serious compromises to principles in order to obtain the level of funding it would take to continue to build, grow the Sawiyan ‘organization’—compromises that could conclude in a debilitating compromise of trust with the communities we had deeply invested. Compromises that could even jeopardize the standing of the organization in the eyes of local authorities.

(b) De-register, continue to invest in our leaders and community initiatives informally and with little to no funding BUT ensure the safety and integrity of the Sawiyan movement.

Obviously, we chose direction ‘(b)’, a decision that was bitter-sweet. On one hand, we wished the local legal environment, humanitarian sector, and philanthropic world was more in touch with the realities we deal with, and, in turn, could collaborate with us in ways that could allow us to grow in a healthy, organic way while allowing us to fully determine what success and impact would be defined as on our own terms. On the other hand, we felt fulfilled and content with the fact that we made all these decisions with our communities, in line with our principles, and sustain a strong relationship to this day with the communities we serve.

Though we feel content with the path we chose, it is indeed frustrating. ‘What could have been’ in a more conducive, understanding, and supportive environment for an organization like Sawiyan?

One thing that is clear though, is that the current state of the humanitarian and development sector, both in MENA and around the world, is deeply troubling. Much of the principles international agencies preach and stand behind are not being practiced on the ground. Though it’s important that more and more folks in the sector are seeing the importance of localized ownership over rights protection and response planning, there’s a stark difference between the conversations being had…and the actual actions/deeds of some of these same folks and agencies on the ground. It’s not just about the commitment to finance locally, but the approach to how you finance. Are key stakeholders willing to truly trust local organizations and the intimate expertise they have on the issues they’ve sacrificed so much to address? That trust involves financing with fewer strings, that takes into consideration the uniquely complex financing barriers found in a particular country. It involves having local organizations and refugee leaders at the table when refugee response plans are being drawn up. It means letting go of long-standing power and control over humanitarian coordination and governance and allowing locally-led organizations and refugees themselves to have a significant political stake and influential say on how aid and community development is coordinated, governed, and distributed.

Our team has met other organizations like ours not only in Jordan, but from Lebanon, Turkey, India, and beyond that shared similar experiences in regard to their relationships with donors or leading international agencies. Similar experiences, disappointment, and heartbreak from tough decisions we wish we weren’t forced to make. We would often commensurate with each other, asking the following questions: What if the model was different? What if donors’ annual funding priorities were truly informed by locally led organizations, community leaders, and activists? What if regional and country-specific Refugee Response Plans were truly informed by the civil society, community leaders, and the activists of the communities these Plans actually affect? What if donors allowed the local organizations and grassroots initiatives they finance to truly dictate how they will monitor and define the success of their projects and causes? This is what real localization-in-action looks like, our team thinks.

Final goodbyes to Sawiyan ‘Day Ones’ before leaving Jordan.

The Promise.

Which leads me to the promise I made.

It was really hard to leave Sawiyan last year. The emotions, sacrifice, and loss involved with stepping down and away from the Sawiyan family (some of the best friends, brothers, sisters, and mothers anyone could be given) have been difficult to carry. Padded on top of these feelings was the frustration of the systems, organizations, and ‘advocates’ who had failed organizations and movements like ours…so I made a promise. A promise that in this next chapter, I’d give all I could (time, passion, positionality, network, knowledge, money, ect) towards working towards a future where those leading organizations and movements like Sawiyan—whether in the Middle East or right here in my backyard in the United States-- would be valued, invested in, empowered, and their insight/experience trusted to the level they rightly deserve.  

This promise has led me to found Locally Led. To make good on a promise. An ‘indefinite passion project’ for myself and a number of others for the foreseeable future. Locally Led is the culmination of channeling frustration about broken systems into hope and action. An organization created by those who passionately believe in the power of community-driven movement and how it brings about a healthier, just, more communal society. Created by and for those who have led community-based non-profits, refugee-led organizations, and social movement in different parts of the world. Those who have lived it. Who have experienced the beauty of collective action and felt the frustration of working in broken systems. Who strongly believe that there is a more ethical, efficient, and relational way to support, accompany and finance locally and refugee-led change around the world. 

Both Locally Led and I stand in solidarity with the multitude of others around the world who we have learned from over the last few years. Those already leading by example in ‘shifting the power’ in the philanthropy, aid, and development realms. We’ve been greatly inspired by many of you, your organizations, and how you relate with the communities you serve and fight for. There are so many incredible people, whose unique experiences, insights, and personal journeys are challenging the systems that be and showing us all what philanthropy and community mobilization can look like if we dare to think differently. Know that your work inspires us and brings us hope knowing the strength and passion of an already vibrant movement in the making we get to stand beside in this fight.

In the coming months, I look forward to sharing more about Locally Led, what we’re learning, and who we’ll have the privilege of partnering with. Our ambition is for this new family to be constantly evolving and learning from each other. One that is always critically examining its own assumptions and beliefs. Recognizing the inherent dignity and worth of all individuals, and using that recognition as a foundation for building more just and equitable communities. A family that takes action to challenge the systems, structures, and power dynamics that perpetuate inequality and oppression. A group comprised of different personal experiences, circumstances, stories, and passions committed to the pursuit of radicle love [14]…

If any of that resonates with you or you’re interested in supporting, volunteering, or partnering with Locally Led, we’d love to hear from you.

Endnotes

[1] Devex and DI. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report. 2021

[2] Defined as the belief that those leading response and development planning should be from the communities most affected by the issue trying to be solved.

[3] See Johnstone, Kvittengen, and Baslan’s Realizing The Rights Of Asylum Seekers And Refugees In Jordan From Countries Other Than Syria,  the One Refugee Approach Working Group’s 2020 and 2021 Situation Report, the Mixed Migration Center’s Social Networks In Refugee Response What We Can Learn From Sudanese And Yemeni In Jordan, UNHCR’s 2019 Protection Working Group guidance note on non-Syrians, and the recommendation section of the WFP’s CVFS Assessment and the University of Bath’s investigation into Child Neglect in Jordan.

[4] Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Plan For The Syria Crisis 2020-2022, 2020.

[5] One Refugee Approach Working Group, The One Refugee Approach In Jordan: Situation Report September 2020.

[6] An anonymous interview with a senior official of a donor state to Jordan

[7] Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner, “Learning from the Jordan Compact”, Forced Migration Review, No. 57, February 2018.

[8] Lenner and Turner, 2018.

[9] Center For Strategic  & International Studies. USAID’s New Localization Approach Can Address Migration in the Northern Triangle. 2022

[10] Brookings Institute. Locally driven development: Overcoming the obstacles. May 2022

[11] Brookings Institute, above note 10

[12] Abdirahman, Khalif. ALNAP-NEAR: Locally led humanitarian action in Somalia. 2022.

[13] Locally led humanitarian action in Somalia. See note 12.

[14] Freire's ‘Pedagogy of The Oppressed’. 1970